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Abstract
This paper examines whether corruption can be an efficiency enhancing adaptation to 
poor institutional environments.  Prior research on this question has not taken into account the 
heterogeneity of corruption or the possibility that petty bureaucratic corruption in the form of 
bribery may grease the wheels of an economy at the same time that grand political corruption 
such as diversion of state funds may sand the wheels of economic growth.  By differentiating 
between grand and petty corruption and narrowly framing poor institutional quality as the burden
of regulation on economic activity, I am able to show that bribery is not an efficiency enhancing 
adaptation to poor regulatory environments.  To the contrary, given the specific type of 
corruption and institutional environment most conducive to an efficiency enhancing effect, the 
opposite effect was found.
1.  Introduction
Are there some types of corruption, or some environments within which it can occur, 
where corruption is less economically harmful than others?  Are there any conditions where the 
effects of corruption cross the threshold from being less negative, to being positive and 
efficiency enhancing?  Simply put, is corruption always and everywhere a bad thing?
A search of EconLit shows that over the course of the past decade, from November 2003 
to November 2013, over two thousand papers have been published in peer reviewed economics 
journals on the subject of corruption.  This figure does not include research published in journals 
of political science, sociology, psychology, international relations, or anything published in any 
language other than English.  And yet within this vast landscape of literature, the answer to this 
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fundamental question remains unclear.
The bulk of the economic literature on this subject begins from the assumption that 
corruption is economically destructive and then proceeds to ask questions such as: How 
destructive it? (Fisman et al. 2007)  Why does it persist? (Mishra 2006)  How can we reduce it?  
(Riley 1998)   A small subset of the literature does explicitly examine the question of whether, or 
under what conditions, corruption may have substantially different economic effects.  Blackburn 
et al. (2009) study the issue of why corruption seems more harmful in some countries than in 
others, and conclude that an important factor is the degree to which government officials 
coordinate their illicit actions.  Rock et al. (2004) examine the Asian growth paradox of 
simultaneously high levels of corruption and high rates of growth and find that the corrupt 
relationships exist in a more symbiotic than predatory form.  
A smaller group of papers examine the specific question of whether corruption can be a 
net positive for an economy.  The phrases frequently used as shorthand to refer to this question 
are: does corruption “grease the wheels” of economic activity or does it “sand the wheels”?  An 
example of the grease the wheels hypothesis is Johnson et al. (2012) who study variations in 
corruption and economic performance in the United States as a function of State level regulations
and find that corruption inhibits economic activity less where regulation is more vigorous.  
Dreher et al. (2013) provide additional support for the grease the wheels hypothesis in a study of 
43 countries where corruption is found to facilitate firm entry in burdensome regulatory 
environments.
The reasoning behind grease the wheels is that corruption can be a form of Coasian 
bargaining, as an efficiency enhancing response to defective institutions.  This principle was 
2
expressed succinctly by Nathaniel Leff (1964), "if the government has erred in its decision, the 
course made possible by corruption may well be the better one."  This sentiment was put more 
bluntly by Samuel Huntington (1968) , "In terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than 
a society with a rigid, over-centralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, 
over-centralized, honest bureaucracy.”
The sand the wheels theory holds that, although there may be some variations in effect, 
corruption is never a net benefit.  Mauro (1995) finds a significant negative association between 
corruption and investment resulting in lower GDP in high corruption states.  Banerjee (1994) 
finds that rather than reducing the burden of inefficient regulation, corruption may cause it to 
increase due to government officials having an incentive to create economic road blocks that 
require bribes to avoid.
Papers addressing this question reach a large variety conclusions, many of which are 
contradictory, (Campos et al. 2010).  Given the large quantities of capital, both financial and 
political, devoted to anti-corruption efforts it seems a reasonable goal to know under what 
conditions our efforts are ineffective, or even counterproductive.  
A research design to answer this question must begin with a theory of why previous 
approaches have not yielded one generally consistent answer.  I propose it is for two reasons:  
First, most papers attempting to find the effect of corruption on growth do not differentiate 
between institutional settings.  To extend the metaphor, believing corruption can grease the 
wheels of an economy presupposes that the wheels are squeaking and in need of additional 
grease.    This is analogous to economic activity within a framework of substantially inefficient 
institutions.  If the institutional inefficiencies are small, making them smaller through corruption,
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or any other process, will not yield large improvements.  If this is true, then failing to find an 
efficiency enhancing effect of corruption on growth may be due to two different reasons.  The 
effect may not exist, or the particular environments studied may not have large enough 
inefficiencies for corruption to perceptibly correct.  If the entire universe of environments are 
studied, then failure to see a positive effect of corruption only reveals that either the effect does 
not exist, or it is not perceptible in the average institutional environment.  This approach cannot 
reveal whether the effect exists within a minority of environments where institutions are 
especially poor.   A prominent example of a study that avoids this problem by differentiating 
between weak and strong institutional environments is Meon et al. (2010) which finds that 
corruption can improve economic efficiency where institutions are particularly ineffective.  Aidt 
et al. (2008), however, make the same distinction and find that although corruption is more 
harmful in strong institutional environments, it does not have a positive effect on growth in 
environments with weak institutions.
A second reason that finding consistent conclusions has been difficult in this area is the 
lack of differentiation in these studies between types of corruption.  The broader corruption 
literature divides corruption into two primary types; “grand corruption”, also sometimes referred 
to as “political corruption” and “petty corruption” also sometimes called “bureaucratic 
corruption”, (Bohn, 2013), (Mashali, 2012).  To clarify the difference, an example of petty 
corruption would be a bribe to obtain a construction permit.  An example of grand corruption 
would be diverting a portion of foreign aid into a Swiss bank account.  Although such a 
distinction may have been incorporated into studies of the effect of corruption on economic 
growth, it is sufficiently rare that I have not encountered an example.
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Averaging over multiple types or environments of corruption where there is scant 
theoretical basis for believing the effect would exist could dilute the the appearance of any 
efficiency enhancement to the level of being undetectable.  Therefore, in order to determine how 
corruption effects economic growth, it is necessary to examine the specific type of corruption 
and the specific environment of corruption where theory predicts any efficiency enhancing effect
would occur.
To that end, in this paper I focus my investigation on the bribery subset of broadly 
defined corruption and the burdensome business regulations subset of broadly construed poor 
institutions that bribery is used to remedy.  If corruption can be grease, it should be evident here.
2.  Methodology
I regress per capita income growth on two primary variables, a measure of bribery and a 
measure of the burden on economic activity imposed by the regulatory environment and an 
interaction term between the two primary variables.  I include three control variables commonly 
used in similar studies, literacy rate as a proxy for human capital (Ranis et al. 2000), tariff rate as
a proxy for openness to international trade (Eris et al. 2013), and government size (Oriakhi et al. 
2013) resulting in the regression equation:
growthi=β0+β1 bribei+β2 regulationi+β3 bribei∗regulationi+βk X ' i+ϵi           (1)
Where growth is per capita GDP growth, bribe is the rate of bribery, regulation is the 
efficiency of regulations on business, bribe*regulation is an interaction term, X is a vector of k 
control variables, and ε is an error term. The subscript i indexes countries. The key to the 
regression is the interaction term.  Following the method of Meon et al. (2010), this is most 
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easily understood by taking the partial derivative of equation (1) with respect to bribery:
 
δ growthi
δbribe i
=β1+β3 regulationi                                                     (2)
Assume that the grease the wheels hypothesis is correct.  In the case of infinitely 
burdensome regulations on business regulation would be zero.  This would cause the
β3 regulationi term to drop out, leaving 
δ growthi
δbribe i
=β1 Then β1 would have to be positive 
in order for bribery to have a positive effect on growth.  In the alternate case of infinitely 
efficient regulations on business, regulationi would be one, β1 would still be positive, but
β3 would now have to be negative to reduce the beneficial effect of bribe on growth in the best
institutional environment below its value in the worst institutional environment.  If we take the 
opposite assumption, that the sand the wheels hypothesis is correct, then equation (2) must never 
be positive and the damage done to growth by bribe must increase as institutions get worse.  This
requires β1 to be negative so that bribe reduces growth in the worst institutional environment 
where regulation would be zero.  Further, if β1 is negative, then in the best institutional 
environment where regulation is one, β3 would have to be positive to cause the effect of 
bribery on growth to decline as regulation improved.
3.  Data
The dependent variable is GDP per capita growth taken from the World Bank on-line data 
catalog.   This was chosen for several reasons.  First, growth reflects the behavior of an economy 
as it is currently, in contrast to a measure such as per capita GDP which reflects the accumulated 
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behavior of an economy over time.  Since the other data used in the regression were not the 
product of accumulations over time, economic growth was chosen to maintain consistency.  
Second, GDP per capita growth is constructed from GDP and population.  Both of these are 
relatively unambiguous characteristics of a country and are measured by well established 
standards.  Other measures of economic performance have been used in in similar studies such as
a stochastic frontier efficiency rating.  That approach was considered for this paper, but was 
eventually rejected on the grounds that it introduced an additional layer of uncertainty in the 
interpretation of the results of the regression.
The two core independent variables are the rate of bribery, more formally referred to as 
informal payments to public officials, and ease of doing business.  Informal payments to public 
officials is taken from the World Bank World Development Indicators data set.  This indicator 
originates in the World Bank Enterprise Survey of 130,000 firms in 128 countries and is 
expressed as the percentage of firms reporting the payment of a bribe in the prior three years.  An
obvious concern in collecting survey data on corruption is that it is, by definition, an illegal act.  
Even in cultural contexts where there is little or no associated stigma, it is reasonable to question 
whether the respondents are sufficiently forthcoming for the resulting data to be reliable.    The 
Enterprise Analysis Unit of the World Bank addresses this issue in their Methodology section:
Due to sensitive survey questions addressing business-government relations and 
bribery-related topics, private contractors, rather than any government agency or an
organization/institution associated with government, are hired by the World Bank to 
collect the data.
Confidentiality of the survey respondents and the sensitive information they provide 
is necessary to ensure the greatest degree of survey participation, integrity and 
confidence in the quality of the data. Surveys are usually carried out in cooperation 
with business organizations and government agencies promoting job creation and 
economic growth, but confidentiality is never compromised.
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The second core independent variable, ease of doing business, is from the World Bank, 
Doing Business project.  The ease of doing business index is an average of the ranking of a 
county's scores on ten topics: starting a business; dealing with construction permits; getting 
electricity; registering property; getting credit; protecting investors; paying taxes; trading across 
borders; enforcing contracts; and resolving insolvency.  The information used to construct each 
score is derived only from primary sources such as reading the national tax code to determine 
rates or consulting directly with local government officials.  I considered it preferable to use this 
fact based data approach to measuring institutional quality rather than an opinion or perceptions 
based approach, such as is used in the World Economic Forum Global Competitive Index, in 
order to make the definition of strong versus weak institutions in this context as objective as 
possible.  The number was rescaled from one to 189 with one being best to zero to ten with ten 
being best.
Three control variables were selected; literacy rate, average tariff rate, and government 
expense as a fraction of GDP.  Literacy rate of all adults defined as 15 years of age or older was 
taken from the World Bank World Development Indicators database and is expressed as a 
percentage.  Literacy is included as a control due to its usefulness as a proxy for human capital  
as shown by Hanushek (2013).  Average import tariff rate was also taken from the  World Bank 
World Development Indicators database.  It is included as an indicator of openness to trade.   The
third control variable, government expenditure as a fraction of GDP, is taken from the same 
dataset.  These three controls were selected on the basis of having both a strong theoretical 
association with economic growth and being common in the corruption/growth literature.  
Campos et al. (2010) found they were used in 73 percent (human capital), 32 percent (trade 
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openess), and  40 percent (government spending) of papers on that topic.   Dependent, primary, 
and control variable data was averaged over the period 2000 to 2010. Summary statistics are 
shown in table 1.
Table 1. Summary statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Per capita GDP growth 199 2.5929 2.6145 -4.9269 13.6104
Bribe rate 130 31.8759 21.36.52 0.4000 88.4750
Ease of doing business 188 4.9778 2.8659 0.0526 9.9473
Interaction term 130 120.6580 89.5569 2.2000 408.8526
Literacy rate 150 81.3271 19.64.79 19.0318 99.9982
Tariff rate 180 9.3105 5.9732 0.0000 30.2600
Government size 138 25.3164 11.1365 3.3507 78.3830
4.  Results
Table 2 shows the results of the primary regression.  
Table 2. Results of regression of GDP per capita growth
Coefficient t P>|t|
Bribe rate -0.0157 -0.65 0.519 
Ease of doing business -0.0058 -0.03 0.975 
Interaction term 0.0138 ** 2.58 0.012
Literacy rate 0.0429 ** 2.58 0.012
Tariff rate 0.1363 ** 2.23 0.028
Government Size -0.0426 -1.43 0.156 
Constant -1.7755 -0.87 0.386 
*** Significant at the 1% confidence level
**   Significant at the 5% confidence level
*     Significant at the 10% confidence level
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The signs of bribe rate and the control variables are as expected, but the sign of ease of 
doing business is unexpectedly negative.  Although it is not plausible that making it harder to 
conduct business is good for economic growth, this counterintuitive result is not indicative of a 
problem with the regression for two reasons.  First, the p-value of 0.975 indicates that the result 
is far from significant.  Second, the inclusion of an interaction term alters the meaning of the 
primary variables such that even if it was highly significant, it would mean that the coefficient 
was -0.0058 only when the other component of the interaction term was exactly zero, which is 
never the case.
Putting the regression coefficients into equation (2) yields the following:
δGDP per capita growth
δbribe rate
=−0.016+0.014∗ease of doing business               (3)
To more easily interpret the equation's meaning, consider the extreme cases.  If ease of 
doing business takes its smallest possible value of zero, implying maximum difficulty to do 
business, then the second term drops out and we are left with:
GDP per capita growth=−0.016 bribe rate+constant                                (4)
Ignoring the constant, assume now that the bribe rate takes its most extreme possible values; 0% 
and 100%.  In the former case the bribe rate has no effect on GDP growth, and in the latter case it
reduces GDP growth.  If, on the other hand, the value of ease of doing business takes its largest 
possible value of one, then the result is:
δGDP per capita growth
δbribe rate
=−0.016+0.014∗1=−0.002                          (5)
Which again indicates an inverse relationship between the rate of bribery and growth of per 
capita GDP.
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5.  Robustness
5.1 Robustness to controls
A possible objection is that the results were due to incorrect specification of the control 
variables.  To test for this condition, robustness of the regression to alternative groupings of 
control variables was conducted.  The regression was run again excluding each control variable 
in turn and then excluding all three.  Results are shown in table 3.  There was no change in sign 
of any variable as compared to the original results with the exception of tariff rate which changed
from significant positive to not significant negative when literacy rate was excluded from the 
regression.
Table 3.  Results of regression of GDP per capita growth with alternative controls
Variable Literacy rate 
excluded
Tariff rate 
excluded
Government 
size excluded
All controls 
excluded
Bribe rate -0.015 -0.019 -0.028 -0.027 *
Ease of doing business -0.116 -0.109 -0.168 -0.197
Interaction term 0.015 *** 0.014 ** 0.017 *** 0.017 ***
Literacy rate -- 0.022 0.017 --
Tariff rate -0.018 -- 0.050 --
Government Size -0.012 -0.046 -- --
*** Significant at the 1% confidence level
**   Significant at the 5% confidence level
*     Significant at the 10% confidence level
5.2 Robustness to sample
A second objection may be that the results could be due to the influence of one or more 
outliers in the data.  To test for this possibility, the regression was run again on a randomly 
selected subset of the data consisting of 100 of the 199 countries used in the original data.  This 
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procedure was repeated a total of ten times, each using a new random subset.  In no case did a 
variable change sign and remain significant at the 10% confidence level.
6.  Conclusion
In this paper I examined whether corruption can be an efficiency enhancing adaptation to 
poor institutional environments.  Prior research on this question has not taken into account the 
heterogeneity of corruption and the possibility that petty bureaucratic corruption in the form of  
bribery may grease the wheels of an economy at the same time that grand political corruption 
such as diversion of state funds may sand the wheels of economic growth.
By differentiating between grand and petty corruption and narrowly framing poor 
institutional quality as the burden of regulation on economic activity, I was able to show that 
bribery is not an efficiency enhancing adaptation to poor regulatory environments.  To the 
contrary, these results indicate that given the specific type of corruption and institutional 
environment most conducive to an efficiency enhancing effect, the opposite effect was found.   
On this basis I conclude that the grease the wheels theory of corruption is not correct.  
In answer to the question posed at the beginning of this paper: yes, corruption is always 
and everywhere a bad thing.
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